Imre de Tahy
Imre de Tahy, Hungarian Legation Secretary, Berlin, Germany, 1941-1943, First Secretary, Hungarian Legation in Bern, Switzerland, Supervision of the Royal Hungarian Consulate General in Geneva and Zurich, Switzerland, and Chargé d’Affaires, Hungarian Legation in Bern, Switzerland, 1943-1948
Prepared by Eric Saul
Institute for the Study of Rescue and Altruism in the Holocaust
Copyright Eric Saul. All rights reserved.
Imre de Tahy was the First Secretary and Chargé d’Affaires in the Hungarian Legation in Bern, Switzerland, 1943-1948. In his role as Chargé d’Affaires, he reported to the Hungarian government on the negative press campaign against Hungary in regards to its collaboration with Germany in the treatment of its Jews. His actions and warnings may have had a positive effect on the Hungarian government to halt the deportations. It also allowed for the emigration of Jewish children and others to emigrate to Palestine and other safe havens.
Imre de Tahy attended a Jesuit college in Kalksburg (Vienna, Austria) from 1925 to 1933. He then attended the University of Budapest, 1933-1937, and earned a degree of doctor of law in political sciences. While attending college, he travelled in England, France and Switzerland to improve his knowledge in English and French.
Between 1937 and 1938, Tahy served in the 4th Regiment of Hussars in the Hungarian army. Between 1938 and 1939, Tahy passed the test for entry into the Royal Hungarian Foreign Office to serve as a diplomat. He took special classes for Foreign Office officials specializing in economics, foreign trade, marketing and international law. In 1939, he passed the final exam for entry into the Foreign Service. In the end of 1940, he became Attaché at the Royal Hungarian Legation in Bratislava, Slovakia. In 1941, he became Attaché at the Royal Hungarian Legation in Sofia, Bulgaria.
Between the end of 1941 and October 1943, he was Second Secretary at the Royal Hungarian Legation in Berlin, Germany. While there, he was in charge of the economic and foreign trade department, which included supervision of all the Hungarian consulates in the then-Nazi occupied countries. On September 17, 1942, the Hungarian legation in Berlin informed the German Foreign Office that it expected interned Hungarian Jews in the German occupied areas of France, Belgium and the Netherlands to be freed. In addition, their property was to be considered Hungarian property, and was not to be confiscated by the Germans. In April 1943, the Hungarian Legation Secretary stationed in Berlin, László Tahy, protested the treatment of Hungarian Jews in Nazi occupied territory. This temporarily protected Hungarian Jews from being treated in the same brutal manner as other Jews in Nazi occupied territories.
In October 1943, Tahy was transferred to the Hungarian Legation in Bern, Switzerland. There, he served as First Secretary in charge of the economic and foreign trade department and was responsible for the supervision of the Royal Hungarian Consulate General in Geneva and Zurich.
On March 19, 1944, the German army and SS occupied all of Hungary. At that time, Tahy resigned his post. Upon the request of Allen Dulles and Mr. Royall Taylor, delegates of the United States government, he stayed on as Chargé d’Affaires at the Legation. Dulles was the head of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in Switzerland. During this period, Tahy was engaged in armistice negotiations between the US representatives and the Hungarian underground.
In June-July 1944, Tahy and another Hungarian diplomatic official in Switzerland, Bela Sarrossy, played an important part in pressuring Regent Horthy to stop the genocide of Jews in Hungary. These diplomats were known to be anti-Nazi in their sentiments. They conveyed information to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry about a developing press campaign in Switzerland protesting Hungarian government actions against Jews. They aptly described the adverse impact the press campaign would ultimately have on the Swiss public opinion regarding Hungary.
On June 16, Tahy sent copies of telegraphic cables, which described the persecution of Jews to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. In addition, he sent a copy of these reports directly to Horthy. In this cable, Tahy stated, “These reports have caused a great sensation and great scandal within the [Protestant] relief organizations in Switzerland. According to press reports, the Hungarian authorities are responsible for the atrocities committed. It is feared that anti-Hungarian feelings will develop in neutral countries…The best impression would be made if an official denial of the reports that the Jews were being deported were issued and if guarantees were given that they are only being removed and not murdered.”
On June 19, Tahy had just returned from Budapest. He informed George Mandel Mantello, a Jewish businessman and an honorary consul for El Salvador stationed in Geneva, of the crisis in Hungary. Mantello was instrumental in preparing international news reports, which he distributed throughout Europe, on the murder of Jews in Hungary. Tahy kept Mantello informed during this period of the Holocaust in Hungary.
Tahy also declared that he was willing to convey his reports to Roswell McClelland, the War Refugee Board (WRB) representative in Switzerland. The WRB was highly effective in ameliorating the condition of Jews in Budapest. It threatened to prosecute Hungarian and Nazi officials after the war with war crimes.
On June 29, Dr. Carl Stucki, Director of the Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs, met with Tahy to convey Swiss reaction to the Hungarian deportation of Jews. In documenting the meeting, Stucki wrote:
“When I used the occasion to explain to him this policy has resulted in a great uproar in Switzerland, he was very moved… The Protestant Church circles had just begun to get involved by sending a request [for action on this matter] to the Federal Council. So far, the press has been relatively mild and only cited reports emanating from a news agency in [Ankara] Turkey. But I am very much afraid that the press will continue with its usual reserve. In that case, it will be difficult for us, if not impossible, to restrain it. What effects this will have on Swiss-Hungarian relations is clear, and needs no further commentary. … Tahy showed complete understanding and [felt that] these [reports of anti-Jewish] events are responsible for very negative [anti-Hungarian] propaganda, for which Hungary will one day have to account. … In Budapest, he [Tahy] did not remain silent and made quite clear [to the Hungarian authorities] the extent to which [news of the deportations] inspired negative reactions in a neutral country like Switzerland. In the meantime, he hoped that the IRC would succeed in doing something useful in this regard. … The two reports about the persecution of Hungarian Jewry and the condition in the [death] camps of Auschwitz and Birkenau were first brought to our attention by Pastor [Alphonse] Koechlin, and a few days later by Refugee Pastor Paul Vogt.”
On July 4, Tahy sent a communiqué to Horthy emphasizing the urgency of taking action and avoiding the distinct possibility that Hungary’s reputation would be adversely affected.
On July 7, 1944, Hungarian Regent Horthy halted the deportation of Jews from Hungary to the death camps. He had previously declared at a Crown Council meeting on June 26, that he would “order a halt in the transfer of Jews to Germany.” The head of the International Red Cross (IRC), Max Huber, communicated with the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He requested permission to send an IRC representative to inspect camps and to distribute aid to refugees. On July 18, Tahy announced the decision of the Hungarian government to allow Jewish children and refugees with visas to emigrate.
After the Hungarian Arrow Cross occupation in October 1944, Tahy resigned from the Hungarian Foreign Ministry and stayed in Switzerland as a political refugee. After the war, Tahy declined a post with the Hungarian Foreign Ministry and did not return to Hungary. Tahy did not want to cooperate with the Communist regime there.
In 1948, Tahy moved to Paris, France, and worked with the Free Europe Organization. There, he organized the Hungarian Refugee Committee in France with Reverend R. P. Eméric Gacsér. Tahy became Vice President of the organization.
In 1951, Tahy and his family emigrated to Canada. Imre Tahy died in Montreal, Canada, in 1990.
In August 1992, the Hungarian government honored Tahy with a medal.
References
Ben-Tov, Arieh. Facing the Holocaust in Budapest: The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Jews in Hungary, 1943-1945. (Dodrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988), pp. 188-190, 194, 196, 197, 225, 226.
Braham, Randolph L. The Politics of Genocide: The Holocaust in Hungary. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), pp. 243-244, 261-262, 766.
Dulles, Allen. From Hitler’s Doorstep: The Wartime Intelligence Reports of Allen Dulles, 1942-1945, ed. Neal H. Petersen (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996).
Erbelding, Rebecca. Rescue Board: The Untold Story of America’s Efforts to Save the Jews of Europe. (New York: Doubleday, 2018), pp 162-176.
Favez, Jean-Claude. Edited and translated by John and Beryl Fletcher. The Red Cross and the Holocaust. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 240-241, 245.
Gutman, Yisrael (Ed.). Encyclopedia of the Holocaust, 4 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1990), p. 690.
Hostoria Miert nem bombaztak am amerikaiaka Navi halaltaborokat? A Tahy-jelentes, 1981 (Hungarian newspapers: Why did the American not bomb Auschwitz?)]
Kranzler, David. The Man Who Stopped the Trains to Auschwitz George Mantello, El Salvador, and Switzerland’s Finest Hour. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2000), pp. 148-150, 155, 163-164, 195.
Lévai, Jenö. Black Book on the Martyrdom of Hungarian Jewry. (Central European Times Publishing, 1948), pp. 233, 308-311.
Tschuy, Theo. Carl Lutz und die Juden von Budapest. (Zurich, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 1995).
Tschuy, Theo. Dangerous Diplomacy: The Story of Carl Lutz, Rescuer of 62,000 Hungarian Jews. (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2000).
War Refugee Board. Final Summary Report of the Executive Director, War Refugee Board. (Washington, September 15, 1945).
Quotes
From Facing the Holocaust in Budapest: The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Jews in Hungary, 1943-1945, by Arieh Ben-Tov (pp. 188, 189-191).
On Monday 23 July, Schirmer sent the following telegram to Mettler, one of Schwarzenberg’s secretaries, from Budapest: ‘Wednesday evening [i.e. 19 July] arrived in Budapest stop Thursday and Friday [20 and 21 July] had talks stop last discussion Monday [23 July]’38
This information is confirmed by the minute of a telephone conversation on 24 July between Burckhardt and de Tahy, Hungarian Chargé D’Affaires in Berne. The latter informed the ICRC that Schirmer had arrived safely in Budapest and had handed over all the documents he was to deliver.39
[…] De Tahy went to see Carl Burckhardt on 18 July 1944, and the minutes of the meeting, written by Burckhardt himself, state that de Tahy brought a reply from the Hungarian government to the ‘parallel’ note on the situation of the Jews in Hungary which the IRCR had addressed to the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 7 July.44 The minutes are worth quoting in full: 45
The Royal Hungarian Government wishes to notify the International Committee of the following:
- The ICRC delegation will be permitted to bring aid to all the Jews in the ghettos and camps.
- The Hungarian government gives its permission for all Jewish children below ten years of age to be evacuated, if possible to Palestine. The German government has stated that it does not oppose the evacuation and will not hinder the transportation.
- All Jews in possession of entry visas for Palestine will be able to leave Hungarian territory under the same conditions as for the children mentioned above. Here too the agreement of the Reich has been obtained.
- All Hungarian Jews who had relatives in Sweden or who have business relations with nations of that country may go to Sweden or Palestine. The agreement of the Reich has been obtained.
Burckhardt goes on to report the ensuing discussion between himself and de Tahy.
In the course of the discussion, Mr. de Tahy claimed that even highly placed officials in Hungary had not been informed of the events which, according to certain reports, had occurred after groups of Hungarian Jews being transported elsewhere had left Hungarian territory. The sole purpose of the transport was to supply workers which the Reich had demanded from the Hungarian government. Burckhardt then asked whether women, children and the elderly were included in this category of workers.
De Tahy said that he did not know.
At present, all transports of Jews to destinations outside Hungarian territory have been suspended.
The Hungarian government would be grateful if the International Committee would take on the task of acting with regard to the Jews on Hungarian territory. The Hungarian government would also admit a commission of the War Refugee Board to Hungary.
Mr. de Tahy said that certain acts of brutality had been committed against the Jews in Hungary but reports of these acts had been greatly exaggerated. He maintained that the acts can be explained partly by the memory of the 1919 revolution but especially as a reaction to the continual bombing to which the civilian population had been subjected. He said that many civilians had been the object of strafing attacks by aircraft in the countryside.
Mr. de Tahy wished to stress that before the intervention of the Reich in Hungary, all property of Jews of Hungarian nationality in countries occupied by Germany had been protected, and all the Jews of Hungarian nationality had been brought back to Hungary at the expense of the State from all the countries occupied by Germany.
Mr. de Tahy was of the opinion that the International Committee could begin helping the settle this painful business by issuing a short press release on the declaration at the beginning of these minutes.46
Comparison of this declaration by the Hungarian government with de Haller’s account of the contents of the—apparently lost—‘technical’ letter from the ICRC on 7 July shows that the Hungarian government was actually willing to grant much more far-reaching concessions to the Jews than the ICRC had asked for in its ‘parallel’ note.
After de Tahy’s visit, the ICRC issued a press release dated 18 July 1944 stating that following approaches made to the Hungarian authorities by the ICRC, the Hungarian government had officially informed the ICRC that the transports conveying Jews to destinations outside Hungarian territory had been suspended. In addition, the International Committee had been given permission to bring aid to the interned or confined Jews, and to work on the evacuation of all Jewish children below ten years of age in possession of entry visas for other countries. Furthermore, all Jews with entry visas for Palestine were to be allowed to go there.47
38 Telegram Schirmer to Mettler, G. 3/26 f (G. 3/48 e)—ICRC Archives.
39 Minutes of telephone conversation between de Tahy and Burckhardt 24 July 1944, G. 59/2/65 (G. 85)—ICRC Archives.
44 Minutes of the meeting between de Tahy and Burckhardt 18 July 1844, procès-verbaux—ICRC Archives.
45 For an even more detailed publication, according to Braham, various notes have been sent before 18 July 1944 to Hungarian Legations in Axis and neutral countries with copies of Sztojay’s June 27 note to Veesenmayer. RLB, The Politics of Genocide, p. 767.
46 Visit by de Tahy to Burckhardt, 18 July 1944, G. 59/2/65 (G. 59/3/65)—ICRC Archives. See also Note de Haller to Pilet-Golaz, 19/7/44, E 2001 (D) 3 1 72—FAB.
47 ICRC press release No. 226 of 18 July 1944, RICR, August 1944, p. 578.
From Facing the Holocaust in Budapest: The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Jews in Hungary, 1943-1945, by Arieh Ben-Tov (pp. 193-194).
Huber’s letter to Horthy was one of the several appeals from abroad which produced a change in the standpoint of the Hungarian government. The first signs of the change were apparent in Horthy’s reaction to the entreaties and warnings from the Pope, the King of Sweden, and the President of the USA through the Swiss government.
On 18 July 1944, Horthy summoned Veesenmayer, the representative of the German government, and informed him that he refused to meet the German government’s demands with regard to the Hungarian Jews.
I shall not go into Veesenmayer’s answer at this stage. It should be noted that when Horthy made this declaration, he had not yet received Huber’s letter, but the letter of 7 July 1944 to the Hungarian Foreign Office in Berne had apparently been transmitted, and de Tahy visited Carl Burckhardt on 18 July 1944 to convey to him the Hungarian government’s reply, which has already been quoted.52
During this discussion, which was particularly important for the relations between ICRC headquarters and the Hungarian government, de Tahy asked the ICRC to take the Jews under its protection, and he said that Hungary was prepared to receive a delegation from the WRB on tis territory. The latter statement indicated that the USA’s message concerning the Jews had produced an effect. It is worth nothing that the Hungarian government was quite anxious that the ICRC should insert an advertisement in the press on its new stance, and the ICRC complied with this request.
A further detail of the conversation between de Tahy and Burckhardt seems to me to be of central importance. De Tahy said that in his opinion, certain instances of mistreatment of the Jews, which he claimed had anyway been much exaggerated could be explained by the memory of the 1919 revolution and, more particularly, as a reaction to the continual bombing to which the civilian population was subjected, many civilians in the countryside being the target of strafing attacks. A declaration by a Hungarian diplomat, speaking on 18July 1944, to the effect that the reports of mistreatment of the Jews by his government were exaggerated, might be politely interpreted as an example of diplomatic reserve. But when that diplomat attempts to explain his countrymen’s animosity to the Jews by evoking, in the same breath, the Communist revolution of 1919, in which Jews played a leading role, and the air attacks on Hungary’s largely undefended rural population—omitting to mention that they were being carried out by Soviet plans—then he might reasonably be thought to be propagating the old theory of Judaeo-Communism and unconsciously justifying the idea that the Jews were guilty of crimes for which they must pay.
Also on 18 July 1944, Burckhardt informed de Haller that the Hungarian representative in Switzerland had given his government’s official answer to the appeal and regarding the activities of the ICRC on behalf of the Hungarian Jews. He added that a statement to the press was being prepared in the hope that it would have a calming effect.53 The statement issued was short and contained a summary of the Hungarian answer, indicating that the deportations of Jews had been suspended and that the ICC had been given permission to give assistance to the Jews in ghettos and camps, and to cooperate in the emigration of Jewish children54 to countries which would receive them and also of all the Jews who had visas to Palestine.
Likewise on 18 July 1944, the Hungarian Foreign Office sent a long letter to the American government via the Swiss Legation in Budapest, in answer to the oral inquiry of 26 June from the US government. The appendix to this letter is interesting in that it explains the standpoint of the Hungarian government on the Jewish question.55
52 Visit of de Tahy to Burckhardt on 18 July 1944 at 12 o’clock, “The Jews must be treated better since their illtreatment went against the grain.” G. 59/2/65 (G. 85 – G. 59/3/65)—ICRC Archives. See also RLB, The Politics of Genocide, p. 766.
53 ICRC to de Haller, 18 July 1944. The note arrived on 19 July 1944, E 2001 (D) 1968/74/14—FAB. It is interesting, that Burckhardt stated that ‘the Hungarian authorities responded to the approaches made by the International Committee of the Red Cross.’ Nothing was known about any official approaches at the time apart from the decision to address Horthy. (And at that period the letter of Horthy had not yet been delivered.) I was unable to find a copy of the letter of 7 July 1944 to the Hungarian government. I was unable to find a copy of the letter of 7 July 1944 to the Hungarian government. See also RLB, The Politics of Genocide, p. 1059. His source: Vadirat, 3:100-2, mentioning this letter.
54 L’action du Comité International de la Croix-Rouge en Hongrie, Communiqué de presse No. 226, 18/7/44, no file number—ICRC Archives. See also Address on the rescue attempts by the WJC, delivered by L. Kubowitzki on 26 Nov. 1944 at the War Emergency Conference of the WJC. Kubowitzki summed up the causes and results of the changes in the attitude towards the Jews of Hungary in July 1944, and stated the official position of the WJC on the problem:
“The relaxation of Hungary’s anti-Jewish policy was brought about at that time by four interventions: the note from the American government to the Hungarian government; the Swedish King’s appeal to Horthy; the representation of the Vatican; and the steps taken by the International Red Cross.
“We urged the American demarche on May 31. We requested a formal note asking for a statement of Hungary’s intentions with regard to her Jewish population since all the preparations … warranted the suspicion that she was scheming their annihilation. The War Refugee Board agreed and, by an unprecedented action, the note was delivered and answered. Hungary declared that she would permit the departure of all Jews who have entry permits to another territory, Palestine included, and that Germany would permit their transit. …
“Finally, the action of the ICRC was also to some extent the result of our persistent representations and decisive conferences of or spokesmen in Geneva with Red Cross representatives. The Committee was informed of the distress felt in certain Jewish circles because of the Committee’s failure to speak up publicly on behalf of the Jews.
“On July 18, the Associated Press cabled from Berne, that the Regent had promised the International Red Cross that no more Jews would be transported forcibly out of Hungary. It seems that large-scale deportations were really halted.” Kubowitzki, Rescue IV, doc. cit.
55 Koeninglich-Ungarisches Aussenministrium an die Legation Budapest, den 18/7/44, E 2001 (D) 1968/74-14—FAB.
From Facing the Holocaust in Budapest: The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Jews in Hungary, 1943-1945, by Arieh Ben-Tov (pp. 196-197).
On 19 July 1944 the ICRC Bureau once again discussed the problem of the Jews in Hungary.58 Burckhardt informed those present of the visit of the Hungarian representative de Tahy on 18 July, of the suspension of deportations and of the government’s permission for large-scale emigration.
58 Minutes of Bureau meeting, 19 July 1944, procès verbaux—ICRC Archives.
From Facing the Holocaust in Budapest: The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Jews in Hungary, 1943-1945, by Arieh Ben-Tov (pp. 197-198).
We know, however, that following the request of the Swiss government to the Hungarian government, de Tahy delivered the famous statement on the suspension of the deportations of the Jews. In this case the question was that of the prevention of official intervention by the federal government. De Tahy said that it was a tricky question since any such action could be interpreted as interference in the internal affairs of a foreign state.
From Facing the Holocaust in Budapest: The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Jews in Hungary, 1943-1945, by Arieh Ben-Tov (p. 225).
Following de Tahy’s visit to Burckhardt on 18 July, the ICRC decided to exploit at once the assurances concerning in particular emigration and relief, which the Hungarian representative had given. On 27 July 1944, Carl Burckhardt sent de Tahy a letter reiterating the promises which had been made, and stating that in order to accomplish its humanitarian mission the ICRC wished to increase its delegation in Budapest. Suzanne Ferrière and Dr. Julius Vischer from Basle had agreed to undertake such a mission, and Burckhardt asked de Tahy to obtain his government’s go-ahead.31
31 Letter Burckhardt to de Tahy, 27 July 1944, G. 59/2/65 (G. 85)—ICRC Archives.
From The Politics of Genocide: The Holocaust in Hungary by Randolph L. Braham (pp. 243-244):
On July 7 (the day Horthy halted the deportations) Max Huber, the head of the IRC, contacted the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He wanted all available information that would ease the worldwide restlessness over the events in Hungary, as well as permission for an IRC representative to visit some of the camps and distribute food and clothing. Following the interventions of Imre Tahy, the Hungarian chargé d’affaires in Bern, Robert Schirmer, the IRC delegate in Berlin, arrived in Budapest on July 21. Schirmer requested, among other things, that he be allowed to visit some yellow-star houses and that the “shipment of Jews for labor abroad” cease. He also suggested that the Jews be concentrated in ghettos similar to the one in Theresienstadt, the Reich’s “model ghetto,” which an IRC delegation had visited and approved on June 23.
From The Man Who Stopped the Trains to Auschwitz, by David Kranzler (p. 93):
In the meantime, Imre (Georges) Tahy, the first secretary of the Hungarian legation in Geneva, had returned from Budapest just two days before Manoliu. Tahy, who was an anti-Nazi, kept Mantello informed of developments in Hungary and was to continue to be of assistance later in the crisis. He now declared his willingness to tell McClelland his own views of the desperate situation of the Jews in Budapest.
In one of his two letters of June 22, Bányai had informed McClelland of Tahy’s offer to talk with Hámori, McClelland’s Hungarian-speaking assistant. This was an especially urgent offer because Tahy was leaving Switzerland for Budapest in several days.37
37 [Bányai to McClelland, June 22, 1944, box 60, WRB.] I was unable to ascertain Hamori’s first name.
From The Man Who Stopped the Trains to Auschwitz, by David Kranzler (pp. 148-149):
The Hungarian legation in Switzerland played a key role in pressuring Horthy to reassert his authority and challenge Hitler’s Final Solution in Hungary. Two anti-Nazi Hungarian diplomats were primarily involved: Imre Tahy, the acting chargé d’affaires, and Bela Sarrossy. Sarrossy acted as the conduit for presenting the products of the press campaign to Budapest in a way that could not have been achieved by an outsider. The two men not only provided a graphic description of the impact of the press campaign on the Swiss public, but they also conveyed the ensuing world contempt for Hungary.22
As early as June 16, the Hungarian chargé d’affaires in Bern, Imre Tahy, sent copies of the Exchange Telegraph cables containing the first news of the atrocity reports to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. In addition, a cable to Regent Horthy in which he described the horrors of the deportations as detailed in the Swiss press, adding:
These reports have caused a great sensation and great scandal within the [Protestant] relief organizations in Switzerland. According to press reports, the Hungarian authorities are responsible for the atrocities committed. It is feared that anti-Hungarian feelings will develop in neutral countries… The best impression would be made if an official denial of the reports that the Jews were being deported were issued and if guarantees were given that they are only being removed and not murdered.23
Three days later, on June 29, the Swiss Foreign Political Department (FPD), or better, Department of Foreign Affairs, already confirmed the impact of the nascent press campaign on the negative Swiss attitude toward Hungary, and quite presciently, prognosticated its future course. In a memo to Eduard de Haller, Dr. Carl Stucki, director of the Department of Foreign Affairs, described his conversation with Imre Tahy, writing in part:
When I used the occasion to explain to him this policy has resulted in a great uproar in Switzerland, he was very moved… The Protestant Church circles had just begun to get involved by sending a request [for action on this matter] to the Federal Council. So far, the press has been relatively mild and only cited reports emanating from a news agency in [Ankara] Turkey. But I am very much afraid that the press will continue with its usual reserve. In that case, it will be difficult for us, if not impossible, to restrain it. What effects this will have on Swiss-Hungarian relations is clear, and needs no further commentary. … Tahy showed complete understanding and [felt that] these [reports of anti-Jewish] events are responsible for very negative [anti-Hungarian] propaganda, for which Hungary will one day have to account. … In Budapest, he [Tahy] did not remain silent and made quite clear [to the Hungarian authorities] the extent to which [news of the deportations] inspired negative reactions in a neutral country like Switzerland. In the meantime, he hoped that the IRC would succeed in doing something useful in this regard. … The two reports about the persecution of Hungarian Jewry and the condition in the [death] camps of Auschwitz and Birkenau were first brought to our attention by Pastor [Alphonse] Koechlin, and a few days later by Refugee Pastor Paul Vogt.24
In a communiqué to Horthy of July 4, for example, Tahy informed the regent of the “hatred of Hungary and Hungarians engendered by the protests in Switzerland.” One of the cables begged, “It would be nice if you could deny the mass murder.”25 Another cable was sent on July 6 by the Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs to the Swiss legation in Budapest, spelling ut the general impact of the press campaign in Switzerland; it described the rising wave of indignation and disgust inspired among Swiss citizens by the news of Auschwitz and the Hungarian deportations of Jews. The cable revealed the fact that for the first time, demonstrations had been organized in religious and political circles. Above all, it pointed out how public opinion had pressured the Swiss government into ending its silence and initiating vigorous rescue efforts, and concluded by stating that the Swiss public was unable to comprehend the Hungarian people’s participation in such atrocities. Such incredulity by the Swiss was certain to affect relations between the two nations adversely. The writer requested that this cable be brought to the attention of the Hungarian authorities and said that the Swiss government was awaiting a response.26
22 See Levai, Black Book, 233, n. 2. In reality, Tahy was not a chargé d’affaires; he was only the representative of Baron George Bakach-Bessenyey, a Hungarian dissident, during the time Baron Karoly Bothmer took over the affairs of the legation in Bern. Tahy acted upon Bakach-Bessenyey’s orders.
23 This is part of a report sent to Budapest on July 11, 1944. E 2001 (D) 1968/74. Bd. 14. BB.
24 Ibid.
25 Bányai-McClelland, July 4, 1994, box 60, WRB. Mantello and Bányai kept Imre Tahy informed of every development in the press campaign. Mantello interview.
26 Ben-Tov, IRC, 177-78.
From The Red Cross and the Holocaust, by Favez, Jean-Claude, edited and translated by John and Beryl Fletcher, pp. 240-241, 245:
The ICRC had come to the same conclusion. On 7 July 1944 Max Huber signed a note to the Foreign Ministry inviting the Hungarian government to allay people’s anxieties by allowing the Red Cross delegate to visit the camps where the Jews had been assembled and to distribute food and clothing. The Hungarians were quite happy to agree to this because in return they hoped the Swiss would help them with other humanitarian problems. So the reply brought by Imre de Tahy, the secretary to the Hungarian legation in Berne, on 18 July, was very largely positive, and the ICRC, contrary to its usual practice, rushed out a press release about it. The Hungarian government authorised the ICRC to send aid to all the Jews in ghettos or camps, and agreed to all Jewish children under ten emigrating to Palestine, together with all adults in possession of an emigration visa for that destination and Hungarians under Swedish protection.18
This reply was accompanied by action. On 21 July 1944, after delivering his message to the head of state, Robert Schirmer got in touch with government officials and was given permission to visit a certain number of places in Budapest where Jews were under house arrest. On 27 and 28 July he went with Born to the concentration camps of Kistarcsa and Szarvas not far from Budapest where he was able to ascertain that the detainees, at least in Kistarcsa, were (given the circumstances) almost properly treated.
All seemed set therefore for an aid operation on an even larger scale than the ICRC was attempting in Romania: the Hungarian government offered its help; an augmented ICRC delegation could act on several different levels at once, particularly over emigration; and it could purchase food and medicines locally if the necessary funds were made available. After taking advice from Saly Mayer, ‘a discrete and experienced friend of the firm’ as Schwarzenberg put it, the ICRC on 10 August 1944 invited to a joint meeting the main Jewish bodies represented in Switzerland, such as the World Jewish Congress, and Jewish Agency for Palestine, the Union of Orthodox Rabbis, Agudath Israel, HIJEFS (Swiss Aid Committee for Jewish Refugees Abroad), the Swiss Support Committee for Jews in Hungary, and so on, not forgetting of course the Joint, the Churches’ Ecumenical Council, the War Refugee Board and Rev. Paul Vogt, often nicknamed ‘the pastor for refugees.’
It was obviously mainly the Joint that was going to provide the millions of pengös made available to the ICRC delegation and the Jewish Senate in Budapest for local purchasing and for the travel arrangements of people leaving. The War Refugee Board would occasionally lend its help over different ways of raising the finance, which varied, as in Romania, according to what was both legal and feasible: the purchase of pengös in Switzerland, the use via clearing of Swiss assets frozen abroad, or the purchase of pengös in Hungary against Swiss francs deposited by the Joint in Switzerland or against dollar credits realisable after the war.
So money was not the problem; what was soon became apparent when the room for manoeuvre actually enjoyed by the Hungarian authorities turned out to be drastically limited. The Germans were still there, as were their fanatical local henchmen. A few days after Schirmer and Born’s visit, and despite Horthy’s 7 July ban, thousands of Jews were deported by Eichmann from the camps of Kistarcsa and Szarvas. So the Hungarian government was being ingenuous—or disingenuous—in claiming through Imre de Tahy that the Nazis had agreed to the various emigration measures already mentioned. On the ground, in any case, Schirmer’s initiatives were blocked: food parcels could not be sent to people transferred to Germany unless the deportations resumed, and no ICRC delegate could get permission to accompany the deportees on the trains taking them to their destination.19
[…] Nevertheless, under the pressure of public opinion and the international situation, a first step had been taken and it was followed a few weeks later by a further liberalisation of asylum. This required the assistance of the ICRC, henceforth given the job of getting exit visas for Switzerland and Sweden out of the Hungarians. Moreover the Federal Council, in the light of the reply brought by de Tahy to Burckhardt on 18 July, revived an offer of hospital beds for children under ten that had been hinted at previously; this time it was made without distinction as to race or nationality even though each trainload contained a certain proportion of young Jews.29 As early as 19 July the Swiss legation was entrusted with launching negotiations with the Hungarians for a first trainload of 500 children.
18 [AG], G 10, note by M. Huber about a conversation with Hartmann, 16 December 1939.]
19 AG, PVCC, meeting of 27 December 1939.
29 AG, G 3/26f, report on the von Wyss journey, 30 November 1944.
Updated November 24, 2019